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Abstract. In recent years, the convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have received
a lot of interest in the side-channel community. The previous work has shown that
CNNs have the potential of breaking the cryptographic algorithm protected with
masking or desynchronization. Before, several CNN models have been exploited,
reaching the same or even better level of performance compared to the traditional
side-channel attack (SCA). In this paper, we investigate the architecture of Residual
Network and build a new CNN model called attention network. To enhance the
power of the attention network, we introduce an attention mechanism - Convolutional
Block Attention Module (CBAM) and incorporate CBAM into the CNN architecture.
CBAM points out the informative points of the input traces and makes the attention
network focus on the relevant leakages of the measurements. It is able to improve
the performance of the CNNs. Because the irrelevant points will introduce the extra
noises and cause a worse performance of attacks. We compare our attention network
with the one designed for the masking AES implementation called ASCAD network
in this paper. We show that the attention network has a better performance than
the ASCAD network. Finally, a new visualization method, named Class Gradient
Visualization (CGV) is proposed to recognize which points of the input traces have a
positive influence on the predicted result of the neural networks. In another aspect, it
can explain why the attention network is superior to the ASCAD network. We validate
the attention network through extensive experiments on four public datasets and
demonstrate that the attention network is efficient in different AES implementations.
Keywords: Side-Channel Attack · Convolutional Neural Network · Attention Mecha-
nism · Visualization Method
1 Introduction
Side-channel attack (SCA) was first proposed on several cryptographic systems by Paul
Kocher in 1996 [Koc96]. Since then, it has aroused great interest in the security community.
SCA is a class of cryptanalytic attacks but different from traditional cryptanalysis. It
exploits the physical properties such as timing, power consumption [KJJ99], electromagnetic
(EM) emanation [AARR02] and even sound [GST17]. In the side-channel community, SCA
is divided into two categories: profiled attack and non-profiled attack. In the profiled
attack, attackers have a copy of the target device. They can fully control of the input
plaintexts and secret key of the replicated device and gather sufficient measurements
(or traces). Then they build a model to describe the physical characteristics. Attackers
subsequently utilize the measurements captured from the target device and perform the
key-recovery process. The profiled attack includes Template Attacks (TA) [CRR02] and
Stochastic models [SLP05]. For the non-profiled attack, there is a weaker assumption.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
08
89
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 S
ep
 20
20
2 An Enhanced Convolutional Neural Network in Side-Channel Attacks
Attackers only have a target device, and they do not know the secret key about the
encryption algorithm except the plaintexts and ciphertexts. They extract abundant traces
from the target device and then exploit the statistical analysis technique to recover the
secret key. The non-profiled attack includes Differential Power Analysis (DPA), Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) [BCO04] and Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [GBTP08]. The
attack methods mentioned above are called traditional SCA in this paper. In practical
attacks, pre-processing is required in traditional SCA like reducing the noise of the traces
or selecting Points of Interests (PoIs) before recovering the secret key. Meanwhile, with the
development of countermeasures such as desynchronization [CDP17] and masking [MPP16],
traditional SCA becomes more difficult.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have recently been introduced as a new al-
ternative method to SCA. Researchers found that the profiled attack is similar to the
classification problem in CNNs. For the profiled attack, attackers build a model to describe
the features in the profiling stage which corresponds to the modeling stage in CNNs. Then
attackers recover the secret key in the attacking stage which corresponds to the classifying
stage in CNNs. Thereby, one aspect of SCA is to exploit CNNs to recover the secret key of
embedded devices. Before, CNNs have led to an impressive performance in many different
fields where massive data are available, such as visual recognition tasks, natural language
processing, medical data analysis, etc. In the field of SCA, CNNs have become one of the
most powerful attack methods. In certain situations, they are even better than traditional
SCA. For instance, some recent papers have implied that CNNs are at least as efficient
as TA and under some circumstance, even better than TA [ZBHV20,KPH+19], while
TA is considered to be the most powerful attack from an information-theoretic point of
view. Compared to the traditional SCA, due to the translation invariance and some other
natural characteristics, CNNs are robust to the most common countermeasures like desyn-
chronization or masking [CDP17,ZBHV20,KPH+19,BPS+18]. Another advantage is that
CNNs are efficient to deal with the multi-classification problems to implement end-to-end
classifications. Moreover, CNNs can automatically extract features, so pre-processing is
not needed.
In SCA, there exist the environment noises in the measurements. Traditional SCA and
CNNs are all expected to focus on the informative points of the traces as far as possible.
Because the irrelevant points will introduce extra noises and cause a worse performance of
attacks. For the traditional SCA, it uses Principal Components Analysis (PCA) or Kernel
Discriminant Analysis (KDA) to select the PoIs where most information is contained. But
for the profiled SCA based on CNNs, it has not been considered yet. So in this paper,
we propose a new CNN model. In the model, we introduce an attention mechanism -
Convolutional Block Attention Module. CBAM can make the model focus on the important
points and suppressing unnecessary points. Then we proposed a visualization technique
called Class Gradient Visualization to verify the effectiveness of the new CNN model.
1.1 Related Work
We introduce the application of neural networks in SCA in previous work. One of the
first applications of neural networks in SCA was presented in [YZLC11]. Subsequently,
the applications of multiple-layer perceptron (MLP) in SCA have been proposed in
[MHM13,MZVT15]. In [CDP17], Cagli et al. proposed a data augmentation method
and noted that CNN can deal with the traces misalignment. [KPH+19] addressed how
to improve the performance of the neural network by adding the artificial noise to input
traces. [ZS19] showed that the synchronization method is still useful to CNNs. [YLMZ18]
exploited the time-frequency patterns of side-channel traces and perform a successful
attack based on CNNs. In [HGG18], Hettwer et al. used the domain knowledge to recover
the secret key without any assumption about the leakage.
Another topic is to explain how the trained CNNs work and use the trained models
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to estimate the informative points of the input trace. [MDP19] proposed a gradient
visualization method to localize PoIs based on a successful trained neural network. It
depends on the gradient of the loss function concerning the components of the input
trace. In [Tim19], Timon et al. introduced a Sensitivity Analysis to reveal the secret
key and PoIs of the input trace. The method is similar to the gradient visualization
in [MDP19]. In [ZBHV20], Zaid et al. explained the role of hyperparameters using some
specific visualization techniques including Weight Visualization, Gradient Visualization,
and Heatmap. [HGG19] investigated three attribution methods especially the Layer-wise
Relevance Propagation (LRP) to reveal the PoIs of the input traces. [PEC19] evaluated
the neural network using a backward propagation path method. It can verify what the
neural network learned from the side-channel traces.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1. We investigate the architecture of Residual Network and propose a new CNN model.
To reduce the noises introduced by irrelevant points, we enhance the attention
network by introducing an attention mechanism — Convolutional Block Attention
Module. CBAM can make the CNN models focus on the informative part.
2. We propose a new visualization method called Class Gradient Visualization (CGV)
to recognize what the networks focus on in the training process and verify the
effectiveness of the attention network.
3. We validate the attention network through extensive experiments on four publicly
available datasets, and the results show that the new CNN model is efficient in
different AES implementations.
1.3 Organizations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notations of
SCA. Then introduce the profiled attack and evaluation metrics. At last, we introduce
an attention mechanism. Section 3 introduces the architecture of the new CNN model
and the application of attention mechanism in the new network model. We perform the
experiments to evaluate the performance of the new CNN model in Section 4. In Section 5,
we proposed a new visualization method and implement the visualization of network
models. Finally, a conclusion is present in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
The first part of this section provides notations of the side-channel attack and the subsequent
parts introduce the profiled attack and the metric which is used to evaluate attacking
result. At last, we briefly introduce an attention mechanism — Attention Module in
Attention Network.
2.1 Notations
In this paper, we use the calligraphic letter X to denote sets and the corresponding upper-
case letter X to denote random variable. In SCA, the random variable is constructed
as X ∈ R1×D, where D denotes the dimension of the traces. The lower-case letter ~x
denotes the realization of X. The i-th entry of a vector ~x is denoted by ~x[i] and the i-th
observation of a random variable X is denoted by ~xi. For the encryption algorithm, there
is Z = f(P,K), where f denotes the cryptographic primitive and Z is the target sensitive
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variable. P denotes the public variable (e.g. plaintext or ciphertext) and K is the secret
key that the attacker aim to retrieve. We denote k∗ as the secret key of the cryptographic
algorithm and k is any possible key hypothesis.
2.2 Profiled Attack
For the profiled attack, there are two phases: profiling phase and attacking phase. During
the profiling phase, attackers have a copy of the target device. They set the plaintexts and
the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm in the replicated device and collect sufficient
measurements X. For each measurement ~x, attackers compute the sensitive variable z
with the known information of the cryptographic algorithm. Attackers aim to estimate the
probability
Pr[X = ~x|Z = z] (1)
by generating a model F : RD → R|Z| from the profiling set {(~xi, zi)}i=1,...,Np , where Np
denotes the number of measurements. Then in the attacking phase, attackers randomly
choose plaintext pi of the target device and collect some measurements. The attacking
set is {(~xi, pi)}i=1,...,Na , where Na is the number of measurements. The secret key k∗ is
unknown but fixed. Aimed to recover the secret key, attackers utilize the attacking set
and the model F (·) built in the profiling phase and compute the score vector F (X) of
the sensitive variable Z. Then they use the Maximum Likelihood strategy to compute the
predicted probability of each key candidate. The key that has the maximum probability is
considered as the recovered key k. when the secret key k∗ is exactly the recovered key k,
the profiled attack is successful.
2.3 Evaluation Metric
In SCA, the common metrics to assess the performance of models are the Success Rate
(SR) and Rank [BPS+18]. In this paper, we use the Rank to evaluate the performance of
models. Given Na attacking measurements, the key guess vector is ~g = {g1, g2, . . . , g|K|}
in descending order of the predicted probability, where |K| denotes the size of the keyspace.
g1 is considered as the recovered key of the models. the key guess vector is calculated by
the log form of maximum likelihood strategy, i.e.,
gi =
Na∑
j=1
log(pˆij), (2)
where pˆij denotes the predicted probability of i-th key candidates in the j-th attacking
measurement. Rank denotes the average position of k∗ in ~g. When Rank is equivalent to
0, it represents that k∗ is equivalent to g1 and implies this attack is successful. The aim of
our attack is to use the minimum number of attacking traces to achieve a successful attack.
2.4 Convolutional Block Attention Module
Attention mechanisms are inspired by the human visual system. One does not attempt to
concentrate on the whole scene immediately. Instead, humans selectively focus on some
important parts and recognize the scene [ZF14]. In [WPLSK18], Woo et al. proposed
a Convolutional Block Attention Module (CBAM) for feed-forward convolutional neural
networks. CBAM separately underlines features along two dimensions: channel and spatial.
Channel attention focuses on the meaningful intermediate features, and spatial attention
stress where is the informative part.
For channel attention module, the module independently uses a Global Average Pooling
(GAP) operation and a Global Max Pooling (GMP) operation to extract the average
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features and max features of the input features. Then both features are sent to a shared
layer composed of MLP which has a hidden layer and produces the channel attention
maps. The maps are considered to be the weight of each feature. Finally, an element-wise
multiplication is computed between the input feature and the channel attention maps. In
short, channel attention can be characterized by the following formula.
Mc(F) = σ(MLP (GAP (F)) +MLP (GMP (F)))⊗ F (3)
where σ denotes the sigmoid function and ⊗ denotes the element-wise multiplications. Mc
and F denote the input and output of the channel attention module.
For spatial attention module, the module first applies an average-pooling operation
(AP) and a max-pooling (MP) operation along the channel axis of input features and
generate an average samples and a max samples. Then it concatenate these two samples
and apply a convolutional layer to generate the spatial attention maps. This maps can
be viewed as the weight of each time points. Finally, an element-wise multiplication is
computed between the input features and the spatial attention maps. Spatial attention
module is computed as:
Ms(F) = σ(γ([AP (F);MP (F)]))⊗ F (4)
where σ denotes the sigmoid function and r denotes the convolutional layer. Ms denotes
the output of the spatial attention module.
3 CNN Architecture
In this section, we introduce the architecture of the new CNN model and the application of
CBAM in the new network. CBAM makes the attention network focus on the informative
points and suppresses irrelative points to improve the performance of CNNs.
3.1 Basic Architecture of the Enhanced Network
With the development of CNNs, some classical architectures have been proposed such
as VGG [SZ14] and Residual Networks (ResNets) [HZRS16]. Some researchers have
investigated the application of VGG architecture in SCA [BPS+18,KPH+19] and indicated
that the architecture performs well. In this work, we investigate another architecture
- ResNets in SCA and propose a new CNN model called attention network. The basic
structure of the attention network is shown in Figure 1. It consists of several blocks
with similar architecture. These blocks are called residual blocks. Each residual block is
composed of several layers and a shortcut connection. In the attention network, these
several layers are convolutional layers γ, pooling layers δ, and activation functions σ. Each
residual block has two basic blocks. The basic block is composed of convolutional layers
and activation functions. The shortcut connection connects the input and output of the
basic block. It can deal with the degradation problem. After stacking several residual
blocks, the flatten layer and fully-connected layers λ are adopted. Finally, a softmax layer
s is applied to generate the predicted probability of each class.
The structure of attention network can be characterized by the following formula:
s ◦ [λ]n1 ◦ [δ ◦ σ ◦ [γ(x) ◦ σ]n2 ⊕ f(x)]n3 (5)
where n1, n2, n3 represent the number of fully-connection layers, basic blocks, and residual
blocks. In attention network, n1 and n2 are all set to 2, while n3 is up to the datasets.
Shortcut connection is denoted as ⊕. Here x is the input of the current basic block and
f(x) is the function of x. The funtion f is to make the input and output of basic block
have the same dimensions and is a convolutional operation in attention network. The basic
hyperparameters in the attention network are set as follows:
6 An Enhanced Convolutional Neural Network in Side-Channel Attacks
• For the convolutional layers, the size of the filter is set to 11 and the stride is set to
1. The number of the filter is various in different convolutional layers.
• For the pooling layers, we use average-pooling. The pooling stride is set to 2 and the
pooling window is the same.
• The activation functions are all set to ’ReLU’.
The other hyperparameters are up to the experimental datasets and they will be shown
later in the paper. The choices of hyperparameters are motivated by the fact that they
provide good results based on our datasets.
Input  trace
Conv Conv Pooling
Flatten
FC
Output
Relu Relu
Conv Conv Pooling
Relu Relu
f
Relu Relu
f
Conv Conv Pooling
f
Figure 1: The basic architecture of the attention network. As the architecture is shown,
the input of the attention network is the whole traces. The output layer has 256 neurons
which correspond to the 256 classes. We use 3 residual blocks and each residual block
consists of 2 basic blocks. The function f is a convolutional operation applied to the inputs
of the basic blocks.
3.2 Enhanced CNN with Attention Module
For CNNs, it can automatically extract the different features of the whole trace by different
filters of the convolutional operation. But the unnecessary points of the input traces not
only do not provide useful information, but also will introduce extra noises. So some
features extracted by filters are still useless and worsen the performance of CNNs. To
make the attention network focus on the informative points, we introduce an attention
mechanism - Convolutional Block Attention Module and apply it to the attention network.
CBAM can strengthen the representation of the features in the attention network. First,
the channel attention module is used to assign weights to different features. By this
module, attention network can find the important features. Besides, spatial attention is
used to point out the locations of the features. So we use the spatial attention module to
locate the important features after the channel attention module. As is shown in Figure 2,
the attention module is inserted in the first residual block and sequentially uses channel
attention module and spatial attention module. By introducing the CBAM, the attention
network can focus on the informative points of the traces and reduce the noises introduced
by the unnecessary points.
4 Performance of the Enhanced Network
In this section, we apply our attention network on different publicly available datasets.
These datasets will be introduced in the Subsection 4.1 and the results will show in the
Subsection 4.2. Our experiments are performed by the NVIDIA Graphics Processing Units
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Figure 2: Attention mechanism in the attention network.
(GPUs) and we implement the experiment with the open-source deep-learning library
Keras and TensorFlow backend.
4.1 Datasets
In our experiments, we use four public datasets. All of them are the implementations
of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. They are divided into two
types: unprotected implementations and protected implementations. The unprotected
implementations have two types, for instance, software implementation and hardware
implementation. The countermeasures of protected implementations also have two types
such as desynchronization and masking. In the following, we will introduce these four
datasets.
4.1.1 DPAcontest v4
The cryptographic algorithm of DPAcontest v4 is a masking software implementation of
AES-256, which is called AES-256 RSM (Rotating Sbox Masking) on an Atmel ATMega-
163 smart-card. DPAcontest v4 is electromagnetic measurements where it uses the same
secret key with different plaintexts. [MGH14] has verified that the masking implementation
exists the first-order leakage, so we turn the masking protected implementation into the
unprotected scenario. The corresponding leakage model is changed to:
Y (k∗) = Sbox[Pi ⊕ k∗]⊕M (6)
where M denotes the mask of each cryptographic operation and the value is known. P
corresponds to the plaintexts. We choose the first Sbox operation in the first round of
cryptographic operation that i is set to 1.
For DPAcontest v4, the measurements consist of 10 000 traces, each trace with 1000
samples. We divide the dataset into two subsets such that 5000 traces for the training set
and 5000 traces for the attacking set. For the network settings of DPAcontest v4, there are
3 residual blocks and the number of the filters of the convolutional layers in each residual
block is set to {128, 256, 512}. The epoch is set to 60 and the batch-size is set to 200. The
number of neurons of the hidden fully-connected layers is set to 1024. This public dataset
is available at http://www.dpacontest.org/v4/.
4.1.2 AES_RD
The cryptographic algorithm in AES_RD is a protected software implementation of AES. It
is one of the typical classes used in reality. The target device is a smartcard of 8-bit Atmel
AVR microcontroller. The countermeasure of the algorithm applies random delay which is
proposed in [CK09]. Adding random delay in the algorithm causes the misalignment of
the time samples and make the attack more difficult. For this dataset, the leakage model
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is defined as follows:
Y (k∗) = Sbox[Pi ⊕ k∗] (7)
As same as DPAcontest v4, we choose the first Sbox operation in the first round of
cryptographic operation that is i = 1.
For AES_RD, the measurements consist of 50 000 traces and each trace has 3500
time samples. In the experiment, we divide the dataset into two subsets such that 40 000
traces for training and 10 000 traces for attacking. For the network settings of AES_RD,
there are 5 residual blocks and the number of the filters of the convolutional layers in
each residual block is set to {64, 64, 128, 128, 256}. The number of neurons of hidden
fully-connected layers is set to 1024 and we add two dropout layers whose rates are all set
to 0.2. In the training process, the epoch is set to 101 and batch-size is set to 256. This
dataset is available at https://github.com/ikizhvatov/randomdelays-traces.
4.1.3 AES_HD
The cryptographic algorithm in AES_HD is a typical class of the hardware implementations
of AES-128. The hardware implementation was written in VHDL and applied the parallel
operation that it takes 11 clock cycles for each encryption. The hardware design was
implemented on Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA of a SASEBA GII evaluation board. AES_HD is
electromagnetic measurements that were measured using a high sensitivity near-field EM
probe. The suitable and common leakage model of unprotected hardware implementations
is to exploit the register writing in the last round. The leakage model is defined as follows:
Y (Ci1 , Ci2 , k∗) = Sbox−1[Ci1 ⊕ k∗]⊕ Ci2 (8)
where Ci1 and Ci2 denote two ciphertexts, and the relation between i1 and i2 is given
through the inverse ShiftRows operation of AES. we choose i1 = 12 and i2 = 8.
The measurements of AES_HD is composed of 500 000 traces with 1250 samples of
each trace. In our experiment, we only use 75 000 traces that 50 000 traces are used for
training and 25 000 traces are used for attacking. The network settings of AES_HD are
the same as DPAcontest v4, except that the epoch is set to 75. AES_HD is publicly
available at https://github.com/AESHD/AES_HD_Dataset.
4.1.4 ASCAD
The final dataset is ASCAD and the cryptographic algorithm is a masking software
protected implementation of AES-128 [BPS+18]. The implementation is running over an
8-bit AVR architecture that is ATMega8515. ASCAD possesses first-order security that
is robust to the first-order SCA. Measurements are measured using an electromagnetic
probe and stored with the current version 5 of the Hierarchical Data Format (HDF5). The
leakage model is defined as follows:
Y (k∗) = Sbox[Pi ⊕ k∗] (9)
The first and the second Sbox operations in the first round of the encryption process are
unprotected, so we choose the third Sbox operation that i = 3.
This dataset is composed of 60 000 traces with 700 features of each trace. There are
50 000 in the training dataset group and 10 000 in the test dataset group. So we use the
training dataset group to train the CNN model and use the test dataset group to perform
attack. The network settings for ASCAD are the same as DPAcontest v4, except that the
epoch is set to 75 and the number of neurons of the hidden fully-connected layers is set to
4096. ASCAD dataset is available at https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ASCAD.
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4.2 Experimental Results
We will show the performance of the attention network on four public datasets and compare
it with the ASCAD network proposed in [BPS+18] and TA performed in [CRR02]. For our
experiments, we compare these two networks with the Average Rank which repeats the
attacking process 300 times. The test traces are randomly selected from the test dataset on
each attack. The aim of using Average Rank is to reduce the effect of the sequence of test
traces. We verify that the attention network have the same or even better performance
compared to the ASCAD network and TA on different AES implementations.
4.2.1 DPAcontest V4
The first dataset we try to attack is DPAcontest v4. In our experiments, DPAcontest v4 is
the easiest dataset, because we apply the known masks to transform it into the unprotected
implementation. The Figure 3 shows that the attention network has an excellent result
with several traces to attack successfully. The required traces are displayed in Table 1
that attention network demands 3 traces which is the same to the ASCAD network. TA
needs 4 traces to recover the secret key. The result verified that when the AES is software
unprotected, both CNN models perform excellently and have comparable performance to
TA.
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Figure 3: Average Rank in DPAcontest v4.
Table 1: Comparison on DPAcontest v4
ASCAD network
[BPS+18]
Template attacks
[KPH+19]
Attention network
Required traces 3 4 3
4.2.2 AES_RD
The algorithm of AES_RD applies the random delay and makes it hard to align the PoIs.
Figure 4 shows that we need more traces to implement a successful attack compared to
DPAcontest v4. The attention network needs hundreds of traces to make average rank
equal to 0. We also use the ASCAD network to attack the dataset and the result shows in
Table 2. ASCAD network needs 247 traces to make the average rank less than 1. But the
attention network only needs 171 traces. The result shows both CNN models are robust
to the desynchronization and attention network works better than the ASCAD network.
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For TA, it cannot implement an efficient attack even with 20 000 traces, which reveals
that traditional SCA is hard to break the AES implementation with desynchronization.
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Figure 4: Average Rank in AES_RD.
Table 2: Comparison on AES_RD
ASCAD network
[BPS+18]
Template attacks
[KPH+19]
Attention network
Required traces 247 >20 000 171
4.2.3 AES_HD
AES_HD is an unprotected hardware AES implementation. It is difficult to attack because
of a much higher level of environmental and algorithmic noise. Figure 5 shows that the
attention network has a dramatic performance. Table 3 represents the required traces of
the three models. The attention network only needs around 2100 traces to implement an
efficient attack, while the ASCAD network and TA cannot recover the secret key even
using the whole traces of the test dataset. It explicates that the attention network is much
better than the ASCAD network and TA. We think it is because the attention network
can focus on the regions of leakage and ignore the unnecessary points by using CBAM. It
reduces the influence of the noises and improves performance.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Number of Traces
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Av
er
ag
e 
Ra
nk
Figure 5: Average Rank in AES_HD.
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Table 3: Comparison on AES_HD
ASCAD network
[BPS+18]
Template attacks
[KPH+19]
Attention network
Required traces >25 000 >25 000 2100
4.2.4 ASCAD
The cryptographic algorithm of ASCAD applies masks to reduce the relevance between
the measurements and sensitive values. Figure 6 shows that the attention network has
efficient performance in ASCAD. Table 4 represents the traces that are required to
implement a successful attack. The attention network requires 550 traces, while the
ASCAD network needs 770 traces. Though the ASCAD network is designed for the
masking AES implementation, the attention network is still better than the ASCAD
network. For traditional SCA, [KPH+19] performed the template attack, but it did not
retrieve the secret key. They used 500 traces and the Rank is still greater than 50. It
shows the attention network is also better than TA.
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Figure 6: Average Rank in ASCAD.
Table 4: Comparison on ASCAD
ASCAD network
[BPS+18]
Template attacks
[KPH+19]
Attention network
Required traces 769 >500 552
5 Network Visualization
We first introduce the principle of a new visualization method — Class Gradient Visual-
ization. Then we use the visualization method to generate the visualization weight of each
point in the traces and evaluate the effectiveness of the attention network and ASCAD
network.
5.1 Class Gradient Visualization
Though CNNs have a significant performance in visual tasks, natural language processing,
and even side-channel attack, it is still a ’black’ box operation. In the field of computer
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vision, in order to understand how CNNs work, researchers have investigated the visual-
ization technique. (GAP) [LCY13] is directly followed by the softmax layer. [SCD+17]
proposed the Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM). Grad-CAM uses
gradients to locate the important regions in the image. It computes the gradients of the
features of the last convolutional operations to the predicted class. But Grad-CAM is not
suited for the attention network. Because it is only suited to the network using Global
Average Pooling (GAP) after the last convolutional layer. In our network, we exploit the
average pooling and flatten operation instead of GAP. Besides, Grad-CAM is used to
visualize the regions of images which is 2-dimensions. While the measurements of SCA
are always 1-dimension. Therefore based on Grad-CAM, we proposed a new visualization
method in the side-channel context, called Class Gradient Visualization (CGV).
The principle of the CGV is that the convolutional operation with the average pooling
operation of the CNNs is viewed as the process of extracting features. Thus the effect of
the feature maps of the last pooling operation on the predicted result can reflect which
areas of input traces are important and positive to the final predictive class. In the CGV
method, we compute the gradient of the features after the final pooling operation with
respect to the class score.
For the predicted class c, yc denotes the class score that is before the softmax function.
A represents the feature matrix after the final pooling operation such that A ∈ RD×V .
Here D denotes the number of samples and V denotes the number of features. xji is
an element of matrix A where i ∈ RV and j ∈ RD. We first compute the gradient of
feature matrix A with respect to the class score yc and obtain the weights matrix W where
W ∈ RD×V . αji denotes the weight of the j-th sample of the i-th feature:
αji =
∂yc
∂xji
(10)
Then we compute a weight map W cCGV for class c and each element of it is computed as
follows:
W cCGV = ReLU(
V∑
i
xi  αi) (11)
where xi  αi = (x0iα0i , x1iα1i , . . . , xDi αDi ). The larger value of the weight map shows that
the corresponding time sample has a more important influence on the predicted class. In
our experiment, we only explore the positive influence of the samples to the predicted class,
so we use the ’ReLU’ activation function to keep positive effective samples and discard the
negative effective samples. Using the CGV visualization method, we get a coarse weight
visualization of the same size as the pooling feature maps. Finally, we expand the size
of the coarse weight visualization to the original size of the input traces. So we roughly
estimate which regions of the input have more influence on the final predicted results.
5.2 Visualization Results
We visualize which components of the input traces have a positive influence on the final
prediction by the CGV method in the trained networks. For the neural network, not all
the points of the input traces are important. Irrelevant points will increase the noises and
have negative effects on the prediction. Thus the CNN models that take more attention to
the significant parts of the traces and take less attention to the unimportant parts will
have a better performance. ASCAD network and attention network are the target models.
We utilize plaintexts and the secret key of cryptographic algorithms to exploit CPA
analysis and find the leakages of the traces. Figure 7 shows the CPA analysis of DPAcontest
v4 and the extended weight visualizations of the ASCAD network and the attention network.
For the attention network, the visualization weight implies that the part of the largest
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weight corresponds to the part of the highest correlation coefficient in the CPA analysis.
while the ASCAD network not only attends to the informative part but also learns the
unimportant part around the informative area. For AES_RD, though it applies random
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Figure 7: (a) CPA analysis in DPAcontest v4; (b) Weight visualization of the ASCAD
network in DPAcontest v4; (c) Weight visualization of the attention network in DPAcontest
v4.
delay, CPA analysis still finds the region of leakages. The weight visualization shows that
the ASCAD network mainly focuses on the region between 2000 and 3500 in the input
traces. But CPA analysis shows the samples between 3000 and 3500 have no apparent
leakages. The region that the attention network focuses on is consistent in the region of
leakages in CPA analysis (see Figure 8). As for AES_HD, though measurements have
a lot of noise, we still find the main leakages in CPA analysis. The region of leakages
is between 980 and 1000. ASCAD network attends to the information of this area but
still learns the other area which is the beginning of the traces. But the attention network
mainly focuses on the area of leakages in the CPA analysis(see Figure 9).
For ASCAD, due to the existence of masks, the visualization weight of ASCAD is
not apparent compared to the other three datasets. From the result of visualization (see
Figure 10), we find that the ASCAD network almost learns the whole trace, while the
attention network mainly focuses on three regions. The CPA analysis of masks and outputs
of masked Sbox shows that the samples between 50 and 400 leak the information of masks
corresponding to the first region between 70 and 200 and the second region between 350
and 400. The third region around the 600 samples corresponds to the leakage information
of masked Sbox output. By the CGV visualization method, It implies that the attention
network takes more attention to the leakages compared to the ASCAD network. Especially
for AES_HD, attending to the leakages instead of other unnecessary points can improve
the attacking performance a lot, because it reduces the effect of the noises.
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Figure 8: (a) CPA analysis in AES_RD; (b) Weight visualization of the ASCAD network
in AES_RD; (c) Weight visualization of the attention network in AES_RD.
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Figure 9: (a) CPA analysis in AES_HD; (b) Weight visualization of the ASCAD network
in AES_HD; (c) Weight visualization of the attention network in AES_HD.
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Figure 10: (a) CPA analysis of masks in ASCAD; (b) CPA analysis of outputs of masked
Sbox in ASCAD; (c) Weight visualization of the ASCAD network in ASCAD; (d) Weight
visualization of the attention network in ASCAD.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the architecture of ResNets in SCA and build a new CNN
model. Besides, we introduce an attention mechanism — Convolutional Block Attention
Module (CBAM) and insert the module to the new CNN model. CBAM is to make the
network attend to the informative part of the input traces and suppress the unnecessary
points. Based on it, the new network can reduce the influence of the noise introduced by
the irrelevant points and improve the performance. Then we use four publicly available
datasets to analyze the performance of the attention network and compare it to the ASCAD
network. The experiments show that the attention network has a better performance than
the ASCAD network in different AES implementations. We also compare the attention
network to the traditional SCA such as TA, and the results show the performance of the
attention network is extremely better than TA.
Besides, we propose a new visualization method called Class Gradient Visualization.
For a trained model, applying this method on the training traces can understand what the
model focuses on and observe which points of the input traces have a positive influence
on the final prediction. We use this visualization method to attention network and
ASCAD network. The results show that the attention network takes more attention to the
important leakage compared to the ASCAD network. In other respects, it can explain
why the attention network works better than the ASCAD network. In this paper, we only
exploit the CBAM and in future work, we will explore other attention mechanisms and
compare the effectiveness of different attention mechanisms.
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